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'Il1e 19110s :l.n Latin /l~ri ca

Carlo s F. n{az Aleja ndro*
Yale Univ ersity
"'Ine world of the thirt ies, which was Keynesian for
one
rea50 :1-be cause the worv.i~s cf the price -mec hanis m
\':as
so
larr-; ely
suspe nded by D::1)ressicn-·,,;a3 succe eded by the world of
the
forti es
whic h was r.e:/n0 2.im fo-:- quite anoth er reaso n--be
cause
the
price 11Echa'1is.11 was super :;ejed by cor1t rols. 11 John Hicks
(p.99 2, 1979 )

I • Dfl'RODU~ITOH

Tne 191:0:::., broad ly defin ed as the years between the
Gem.an attac k
on Pola'1d and the windi .ric dovm of the Korean conf lict,
wi i-nes sed the
golde n age of irr;:i ort-e ubsti tutjn g indu stria lizat ion
in La.tin P.merica.
Parti cula rly durin g 1945--52 the economic perfo n:ian ce
of Latin Aner ica
shone relat ive not cnly to those of Afric a and Asia,
but also those
of hurop e and Japa:1. 'Ihe a.cce lerat ion in indu strla
lizat ion and urba'1izati o:1 which start ed in the early 1930s conti nued throu
gh the 191J0s end
into the early 1950s. Im incre asing ly confi dent publ
ic secto r also

conti nued du.ri..""lg the 1940s trend s start ed durin g the
earl ier decad e,

Latin Awri can polic y-ma kers looke d back with satis facti
on to
the perfo rman ce and structu:--al changes regis tered between the
late
1920 s and the early 1950 s.
showed remn rkabl e resil ienc e

The econo mies of the reg-,ion had on the whole

m

the face of unus ually frequ ent and

seve re shock s en::uiatil'lg from the inter natio nal econo
rey.

Firs t cc1r.e the

colla pse of the old inter natio nal economi.c orde r in
the early 1930 s,
funda ment ally a nega tive exte rnal demand shock (D{az
Alejandro 1980 and
1981 ).
'lhe 1940s witnessed not just furth er nega tive as
well as
posi tive demand nhocks, but also sever e supp ly disru
ption s. Had
these shock s been fores een in the late 1920s few would
have forec a$tcd
that by the early 1950s Latin /iner ican economies not
only had adju sted
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to them, but in the process had built up a substantial dorrestic industry
while drastically reducine its reliance on foreign capital and trade.
Many

years later one could see in the 1945-52 euphoria the seeds (for

sorre countries) of troubles to cone, yet any observer looking around
the world during those years could find few areas where the future
looked roore pram.sing, both economically and politically , than in
Latin America.
While the 1930s shocks elicited quite heterogeneous responses
from different types of Latin American countries, the 1940s prosperity
was widespread, although the intensity naturally varied from country
to country.

A typology based not on intensity of prosperity but on

policies seems more interesting for the late 1940s and early 1950s.
Countries with medium or large domestic markets, and which on
the whole reacted to the 1930s shocks vigorously, by the early 1950s had
diverged in their policies.

Solre, such as Mexico and Peru, realigned

their exchange rates and inport-repr essing policies so as to increase
incentives to foreign trade. Others, such as those in the Southern Cone
and Brazil, strengthened import-repr essing mechanisms, giving low
priority to foreign trade.

Central American, Caribbean and other smaller

countries (including those still under colonial rule), followed passive
and open policies, which during the 1930s had proven catastrophi c for

. many

of them but that in the circumstances of the 19110s and early 1950s

carried them al~ the prosperous tide emanatin-; from North America.
'lhe rest of the paper is organized as follows.

'!he

sequence and

nature of disturbance s generated by the internation al economy will first
be examined,

'llus will be followed by an analysis of the policies

adopted by Latin American countries to cope with those shocks and with
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other pressu res emanat:1ng danest ically. Then the result:1.ru:'; econam.:l.c
perforniance will be discuss ed. '1he paper will close with some remar.ks
about the state of the La.tin American economies during the early 1950s.

II. EXTERNAL SHOCKS AND TR....~

September 1939 meant both a loss of export markets and a decline
in sources of supply to La.tin America. At first the negativ e demand
shock predominated, and some policy-makers feared a repla__v of the early
1930s.

By

D:!cember 1941 it had become clear that supply short~ es

were to be the major problem.

Ir.Jports into the region reached a troth

during 1942-:--43, not because of a lack of demand or foreign exchange
but either because there were no goods to be found. or because there were
no ships to transp ort them. Supply conditi ons in r.x:>st countr ies im
proved therea fter, by how much depending on geogra phical and politic al
proximity to the United States , but remained a major constr aint and
preocc upation , so that the outbreak of hostil ities in Korea during
June 1950 trigger ed a massive import binge.
Pationi ng ai:"1d price contro ls canpli cate the interp retatio n of

the usual foreign trade indica tors.

Nevert heless, as a broad genera l

ization it can be said that the Latin American ternlS of trade, defined
as the ratio of export to import prices , w1 tnessed an upward trend
during the 1940s, which cootinued their recove ry from the troth reached
during 1930-34, and which culminated during 1950-54. '!here are of
course deviati ons fran this average trend; export ers of tenper ate food
stuffs saw their ternlS of trade peak during 1945-49, while coffee
export ers witnessed an unusual bonanza during 1950-54.

Did the postwar

peaks in tems of trade surpas s those of the late 1920s? Such long
tenn comparisons of price indices are notorio usly treache rous,

particularly given the sharp change which occurred in the Latin American
import bill between those two periods.

Recorded price data show that

at least for the largest countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colanbia and
~xico) the postwar peaks 1n tenns of trade surpassed or practically
reached the 1928-29 levels.
While the tern1S of trade improved with only minor hiccups,
such as the one in 1949, the aggregate export quantum for the region
as a whole was slw;;ish.

Shipping shortages account for a decline between

1935-39 and 1940-li4, but the recovery in the regional export quantum
thereafter was slow, so that b:, 1950-54 it was hardly above the 1935-39
levels.

In per capita tern1S of course it had declined, a decline which

reached spectacular dimensions for Argentina, but which was not registered
by all republics.

Indeed, while the collapse of exports during the 1930s

was witnessed throughout Latin America, by the late 1940s and early 1950s
export performance becam:! more heterogeneous.

That heterogeneity was

due not only to the "corrmodity lottery" but also to the variety of donestic
policies regarding foreign trade, as will be discussed below.

In sane

cases per capita exports by the early 1950s were above even the levels
reached during the late 1920s, while in other countries it was substan
tially below.
The inport quantum is a roore interesting statistic during the

'1940s than the purchasing power of exports.

D.Jring 1940-44 the fonner

1s substantially below the latter, a situation reversed after the war.

For the region as a whole, imports c9llapsed during 1940-44 to levels
not far above those of the depressed conditions ten years earlier.
I>om?stic producers of iltport-canpeting goods and services saw their

.

.

foreign corrpetition practically disappear, but their capacity to supply

- 5 machinery and equipment, fuels arld many raw mate rials and interr
nedja te
goods was limit ed. Even nore so than durin g the
1930s the fall in

per capit a imports did not mean a correspondinr, incre ase in the
per
capit a dcmcstic production of importable goods; it was also accol'J
1)anied
by lower consunption of previ ously imported r,oods and lower inves
trient
1n machinery and equipment.

After the war the regio nal in:port qunntum

recovered sharp ly, so that by 1950-54 it was roore than twice the
1940-414
level and about 80 perce nt above the 1935-39 level . 'lhe regio nal
aggregate hides great er variance during the postwar than during
the
1930s, so that by 1950-54 one has Argentina with imports below
1935-39
level s, while El Salvador and Venezuela have inpor t level s sharp
ly
above 1935-39. Mexico is one of the very few count ries whose impor
t
!Juantum did not fall durin g the war.
postwar recovery of foreig n trade left per capit a imports
of major Latin American count ries below level s reached during the
1920s.
The

Table 1 shows that in this sense recovery from the Great Depre
ssion
was incan plete in key coun tries, such as Argentina and
Chile , whose
parti cular experience was to exert a dispr oport ionat e influe nce
on
postwar Latin American economic think ing.

It may be noted that 1928

and 1929 were for sol!E count ries unusu ally prosp erous
years relat ive

to the rest of the 1920s, while for other s they alrea dy regis tered
foreig n trade indic ators below those obtai ned earli er that decad
e,
as 1n the CUban case. It appears that coun tries whose forei m trade
had lagr,ed behind those of the rest of Latin America up
to the 1920s

were to experience the faste st postwar 1npor t expansion, as 1n
the
cases of Ecuador, El Salvador and Venezuela.

- 6Table 1
Per capita Import Quantum

(1935-39

Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
Chile
Cuba
Ecuador
El Salvador
Mexico
Venezuela

=

100)

1928-29
169
172
15!J
221
195
1Li9
195
157
240

1950-51t
61'

159
121'
101
175
193
254
154
312

Sources: CUban imports at current prices were obtained fran
_Direci6n General de Estaafstica, 1959. They were deflated by
the United States Wholesale Price Index, obtained from Census,
1960. All other data obtained from Naciones Unidas, 1976 •

...

- 7Unexpected changes in autonomous capital movements, which ag;:,;ra
vated the crisis of the early 1930s, provided few shocks durinr.; the
1940s and early 1950s sbnply because of the shrivelli ng of inten1at1 onal
financial flows.

Both loans fran external public agencies, such as

the Export and Import Bank of the United States, as well as private
foreign investrrent occurred at levels which were fairly predictab le
and relativel y unimportant fran a balance of payments viewpoin t.

'lhe

most significa nt changes in the capital account of La.tin Arnerican
balance of payments during the 1940s and early 1950s were the
financial counterpa rts to the real disturban ces described earlier:
when foreign supplies shrank foreign excha"lge reserves rose, and
when foreign supplies expanded reserves dwindled.

It will be seen

below that the management of reserve changes provided serious challenge s
for policy makers, both at the macroeconomic ·level and regarding their
optimal use in time and purpose.
By

the late 1930s it was reasonabl y clear that laissez-f aire

was finished in internati onal economic relations ; by the late 1940s

Latin AiTerican policy makers could base their actions on disconce rtingly
different yet plausible assumptions regard1rig the future evolution of
the internati onal economy.

The

gloorey could focus on internati onal

political tensions, the devastati on and uncertain recovery of Japan and
'Europe, dramatized by the collapse of the return to sterling convertibili ty in 1947, and renewed fears of depressio n in the United States,
where a sharp recession occurred in 1949.

Optimists could point to

the Marshall Plan, new economics and new internati onal instituti ons as
harbinger s of an expansive internati onal econcxny. 'lllis debate was not
to be. settled in sare countries until the early 1960s.

- 8III. POUCIBS

D?cidinc; what was transient and what was pennanent was harder
than usual in the 1940s. Policies which had rrore or less settled dmm
by the late 1930s, after the confusion earlier that decade, had to be
reconside red.

The

instruments fore;ed then, however, became very handy and

were further strengthe ned and applied, not always felicitou sly.

In a

decade character ized all over the world by the politizat ion of economic
relations , even more so than during the 1930s, Latin American govern
nents continued to expand their economic role, both in macroeconomic
policy and regarding long-tenn development.

As during the 1930s, the

balance of payments provided a corrpelling focus of attention , and this
section will first review policies primarily aimed at dealing with dis
equilibriu m in the external accounts ,turning later to other macroeconomic
policies as well as to those direr.ted at longer term targets.
A. Balance of Payments Policies:

The CUrrent Account

Exchange rates during the 1930s rroved, in Latin American countries
able and willing to manipulate them, in a direction contribut ing to the
restorati on of both external and internal balance.

Sharp nominal and real

depreciat ions in those "reactive " countries provided potent stimuli to
import substitut ion in agricultu re, industry and services.

As

reserves

began to accumulate after 1941, the possibili ty of nominal appreciat ions
t

.

began to be discussed in reactive countries ; while steps in that direction

-

cant, a clear trend toward real appreciat ion with respect
were insignifi
,

to the United States dollar appeared, mainly because danestic inflation s
outpaced that in the United States.

Countries which even during the 1930s

passively kept their peg to the United States dollar, or modified it only
slightly, while also maintaini ng a high degree of trade and financial
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. opeme ss, continu ed those policie s durinr-; the 1940s, and their nrice
levels appeared to have followed inflati onary trends in dollar prices
fairly closely .
Before and after the war policymakers in reactiv e countr ies had
to weigh a larr;e mnnber of conflic tin~ signal s and consid eration s in
decidin g what to do with nominal exchange rates.

Even in cou.'1tries where

domestic inflati on was higher than in the United States , at least during
the first half of the 1940s, gold and foreim exchange reserve s rose and
tenns of trade improved.

With demand for export s and supply of import s

subjec t to contro ls by Allied powers, elastic ity analys is of possib le
exchange rate changes seemed pointle ss. Foreign rationi ng, price contro ls
and shippin g shortag es encouraged counte rparts in domestic admini strativ e
cc:ntro ls; unde~ these conditi ons price- level effect s of exchan~e rate
changes were also open to questio n. Not slli:'Pri singly, durinp; the war
there were few exchange rate adjustm ents.
The postwa r exchange rate decisio ns were more complex, even assuming

that major indust rialize d countr ies would gradua lly allow a greate r role to
price-o riented market forces. The prolonged suspen sion of normal market
nechanisms made estima tion of reason able exchange rates a complicated task:
it involved guessin g at least about future terms of trade and capita l flows.
Countr ies with substa ntial pre-war trade and financ ial links to Europe had
also to eval~a te prospe cts for European exchange rates and the 1mpact of
European devalu ations with respec t to the dollar . Faced with these
circum stances , Brazil , Southern Cone and some other countr ies mainta ined
overvalued curren cies well into the 1950s, prefer ring to rely durmg; most
years on exch8I1{;e and import contro ls to manage the balanc e of payments.
Multip le exchange rates, includi ng gray and black ones, prolife rated, but

-10those used in roost transacti ons were 1n real terms substanti ally below
those rev.stere d durin~ 1935-39 (exchange rates are here defined as
units of dCllrestic currency per one dollar).
By

1950-54 Argentina , Brazil, and Chile, had becane archetype s

of overvalued currencie s buttresse d by controls.

Fears that devaluati ons

would exacerbat e inflation and worsen the terms of trade, elasticit y
pessimism (hardly limited to Latin America during those years) plus
perceived danestic redistrib utive effects were the intellect ual props
of this system of trade and exchartGe controls.

Its defenders argued that

it channelled rents from the export sector, including extraordi nary postwar
terms of trade, toward capital formation in industry and social overhead
capital via the supply of foreir.,i exchange at che_ap rates for the im
portation of machinery, eqw.p.'!1ent, and intennedi ate goods cctnplementary
to d~stic productio n.

Goods and services co11peting with local output

were kept out, maintaini ng the extreme protectio nism given by World War II
circumsta nces.

After World War I, it was claimed, incipient industry

was allowed to suffer from renewed foreign competiti on; inport and
exchange controls were to avoid a repetitio n of those events.
other countries willing and able during the 1930s to adjust excha,ige
rates dis so a,__r-,;ain by the late 19Lios and early 1950s, partly induced by European
devaluati ons, thus avoiding the overvalua tion and extensive controls of
, Argentina , Brazil and Chile. Mexico and Peru are exarrples of lesser
reliance oo administr ative quantitat ive controls; these countries by the
late l9llOs and early 1950s had increased their real exchange rates
above their .1nmediate post-war lows.
In countries with extensive import and exchanr;e controls, tariffs

lost jjrportance durine; the l9ll0s both as sources of.~overnrrEnt revenues
and as inst~n ts of balance of payments and protectio nist policies.
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While not all La.tin An'Erican coun tries Joine d the General
Al:'7'eernent on
Trade and Tarif fs (GATI), in the more open economies the
postwar trend
was for a stan dstil l or a decli ne in tarif fs
relat ive to the late 1930s.
As a resu lt of both the mani pulat ion of impo rt-re
press ing rnechanisr:is

and dane stic econor:iic struc ture, by the late 1940s the
cG11position of
irrpo rts diffe red arrong La.tin Ar.1erican coun tries . In Cent
ral .American
and Caribbean coun tries consumer goods made up about half
of the import
bill; in the Southern Cone that prop ortio n was only 15
perce nt. Capi tal
goods accounted for one- fifth of all 1rrI>orts into Cent
ral Arrerica and
the Caribbean, and around 40--45 perce nt in the more .indu
stria lized
coun tries in the regio n (United Natio ns, 1964, p.20 ).
Even in coun tries
where the share of consumer goods in impo rts was relat ively
low, as in
Braz il, fears were expre ssed that the postwar irrpo rt surge
had inclu ded
too many super fluou s and luxur:;· item s, partl y because the
forei gn avai labil ity
of those goods had retur ned to normal faste r than supp lies
of capi tal
and inten redia te goods. Inco nver tible European curre ncies
often had few
attra ctive alter nativ e uses to the purch ase of consumer
goods. The first
repo rt of the United Nations Economic Comnission for La.tin
.America noted
with alarm that trade proje ction s of the European Recovery
Program foresaw
large incre ases of expo rts of consumer goods to South Amer
ica, appa rentl y
igno ring the indu stria lizat ion which had occu rred in those
coun tries ,
, and their needs for capi tal and inten nedi ate goods (Unit
ed Natio ns, 194 9, p. 258) •
Ch the whole, polic y instr umen ts desig ned prim arily
to manage

the curre nt account of the balan ce of payirents were given
a more expl icitl y
prote ction ist tilt durin g the 1940s and early 1950s than
durin g the 1930s,
Parti cula rly in South America and espe ciall y afte r the
inrnediate postw ar
bonanza, the import repre ssing mechanism grew in coop lexit
y; while
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during the 1930s all policy 1nstrurrents made all jroports more expensive,
after the war sane imports were deliberately cheapened (e.e., ca~ital
goods and imports using abundant inconvertible currencies) while others

were made prohibitively expensive. This system caITied a large
potential for aggravating price distortions which had already appeared
during the war.
B. Balance of Payment Policies: The Capital Account
The management of gold and foreign excha11ge reserves, the latter

partly inconvertible;was the central capital account concern during the
1940s.

Reserves rose sharply after 1941; as the range of foreign goods

which could be purchased with them was limited until the decade was
well advanced, and because their foreign exchanp;e corrponent, rnainly
dollars and pound sterling, could be maintained only iJl financial instruments
earning interest rates well below actual and expected inflations in
those currencies, early in the war a number of proposals were advanced
to "repatriate'' foreign debt, settling in many cases 1930s defaults,
and to purchase assets owned by foreigners.
By

191J8, about half of the accumulated Latin .American current

account surpluses of the previous decade had been used to repatriate
foreign debt and to purchase direct foreign investments (United Nations,
1949, p.224).

British railroads were boup-)lt in Argentina, Brazil

and Uruguay; public utilities were also acquired in several countries;
'Mexico settled with oil cOil'l)anies which had been nationalized in 1938,
Canbined with wal'-t~ measures against investments o\\ned or controlled
by Axis nationals, by the late 1940s these policies left Latin America

with the lowest levels of foreign debt ree-,istered this century, and
probably also with the lowest percentage of the capital stock owned by
foreigners which was to be witnessed this century, particularly outside
Cuba and Venezuela.

-13'Ihere have been few detailed studies which could help determine

the ex-post economic profitability of these settlements and purchases,
or their ex-ante econanic rationality.

Che suspects that the evaluation

would depend heavily not only on the specific details of each settlement
but also on assurrptions regarding the opportunity cost of the foreign
exchange reserves, particularly those of inconvertible currencies.

It

is now lmown, and surely it must have been suspected then, that the
United Kingdom seriously considered repudiatiru2; the liabilities it had
accumulated during the war (Bolton, 1972).
By

1948 preoccupations regarding foreign exchange reserves had

returned to 1930s-type concerns with shortage, particularly of dollars,
and especially in countries with traditional c~nt account surpluses
with Europe and deficits with North America.

There was renewed interest

in external sources of long-term capital, which after the catastrophes
of the 1930s were limited practically to loans fran the Export-Import
Bank

of the United States, the newly-created International Bank for

Reconstruction and Development, and private direct foreign investment.
'1he inflow from these sources, however, remained meager relative to

aggregate capital formation.

Latin American policy-makers were dismayed

at the abruptness with which the United States governr.1ent switched its
attention from Latin American development to the reconstruction of
'Europe.

A mnnber of .1mportant Latin .American investment projects had

received financial and technical support from the United States during

the war, and expectations had been created that such measures·would be
continued and expanded after the war.

A rebirth of that war-time economic

alliance (which excluded Argentina) was to wait until the Alliance for
Progress, creating in the meanwhile frustration and resentment among
Latin ~rican policy makers.

C. Macroeconomic and Other Policies
By

the late 1930s reactive La.tin American countrien had developed

the will and the rreans to contain deflationary shocks c ~ from abroad.
Both in 1937-38 and in 1940 the new·policies were tested, and were
found to be robust.

But after 1940 the external shocks were to be

quite different fran those of the 1930s:

in most years they raised

aggregate demand and contracted ag.gregate supply.

&>ttlenecks in

specific sectors were often more visible than general supply problems.
Countries had to S¼~tch rapidly from fighting deflation to combatting
inflation.

'Ihe strupy.,le against inflation was less successful than that

against deflation, so during the 1940s most La.tin American countries
registered price level increases no smaller than those witnessed in
the United States.
D.lring

1932-40 changes in the m:::>ney supply of re-active La.tin

American countries had been dominated by doo:estic credit expansion;
starting in 1942 large reserve acquisitions became the major source of
increases in the money supply.

Towards the end of the war domestic credit

late 1940s, the contractionary effect on dcmestic liquidity were m:::>re
than offset by domestic credit.

With the exception of the Argentine

Central Bank, few monetary authorities had adequate anti-inflationar?
coo.trols and even those in Argentina were weakened after 1943 (Triffin,1945).
Expansion in domestic credit went partly to support new development
programs for private agriculture, housing and industry, and partly to
cover public sector deficits.

diversified in

many

While the tax structure had been modestly

countries during the 1930s, the sharp fall in

inports during the war reduced the base of custans duties, still a major
source of public revenues.

Even as output rose,

tax revenues shrank.

-15Dafense programs were added to the develop:nental expendi tures started
in the 1930s.

With no sit']lific ant bond markets either abroad or at

home, by the end of the

war many governm:mts had turned to their

nx:>netary authori ties for deficit financin g.
'l'he postwar import binge sharply expanded the tax base in

caribbea n and Central J\mer~can countrie s, but the rrore industr ialized
republic s importing mostly capital and interme diate goods had to
continue their search for other public revenue sources .

Sane found

taxation of exports favored by unusual ly high prices an attracti ve
device, implemented either directly or via public narketin g boards.
Income and indirec t ta.xes introduc ed during the 1930s were expanded.
Neverth eless, even during the late 1940s and early_l9 50s, rronetary
authori ties remained a major source of public sector financin g.

Sane

observe rs perceive d a.struc tural inelast icity in the revenue machinery
of La.tin Alrerican governrrents, and an irresist ible m:rnentum in their
developITEnt programs, particu larly outside Central .AITY:rica and the
caribbea n.

'lhese smaller countri es, plus Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela,

IT'.a.11aged to keep their

iriflatio ns not much :t1i.;;i'-ier- than th;e;t of the United

States by no later than the mid-1950s.
'Ille war encouraged the public sector activism which had developed

during the 1930s.

m many

Rationed foreign supplie s of fuel, machinery and

cases foodstu ffs had to be allocate d in ways compatible with the

wartime spirit of nationa l unity.

A minimum of concern had to be

shown for security needs, whether the country was closely linked to
the Allies, as were Brazil and Mexico, or neutral like Argentin a.

Regulat ory

authori ties for agricul ture, conmerce and industry were strength ened or
created ; foreign trade cootrols were of course refined ; prices and waees

-16carne under closer public sector scrutiny.

Public credit institutio ns

and public enterpris es producin~ oil, steel, tra~sport services, electrici ty
and annaments were expanded or started.

'!he Arrred Forces, which in

sane countries had shown interest 1n industria lization at least since

the 1920s, bee~ very active in investment prograTTIS both in heavy
industry and social overhead capital.
The postwar witnessed a relaxatio n of sane of these controls

but the public sector remained actively involved in ambitious developmental
and defense programs, much more than during the 1930s, and with a more
explicit and self-conf ident comnitment to industria lization and other
long-term goals.

The Anned Forces in Argentina and Brazil were to

retain and expand their role in heavy industry and social overhead capital
to this day.

Public credit institutio ns whose creation could be advocated

as correctin g informati onal imperfect ions 1n domestic capital markets,
particula rly at their long-term end, in some cases expanded with the
support of Central Banks during the late 191+0s and early 1950s, providing
credit at interest rates lower than domestic inflation s.

Controls over

many key prices, such as those for necessiti es, public utilities , and
transpor t, were retained in Brazil and the Southern Cone countries well
into the 1950s.
of

many

European condition s encouraged the vigorous postwar role

La.tin .American public sectors at least in two ways:

as noted

earlier the dim outlook for European currency converti bility and recovery
induced many naticnali zations of European-owned assets; and the examples of
growing British and French public sectors led many observers to conclude
that laissez-f aire and private enterpris e, so battered during the 1930s
and the war, were obsolete and would have a very limited role to play
in the postwar world.

-17J)Jri ng the 1930s trad e unions had been enco
uraeed by seve ral

governrrents in the regi on, such as thos e in Bra
zil, Colombia and Mexico;
urba niza tion and indu stria liza tion also promoted
this tren d from belo. . .,.
Trade union influ ence and stre ngth peaked in such
coun tries duri ng
the war, when corp orat ivis t, cen tris t and left
ist orga nize rs en the
whole worked toge ther to expand thos e orga niza
tion s. Not lonr; afte r
the war, governments incr easi ngly con troll ed or
manipulated the trad e
union moverrent, or encouraged by the cold war,
supp ress ed thei r left ist
se@nents, which were also fr~ nte d by divi sion
s between stal inis ts
and anti -sta lini sts. In spit e of the expansion
in the demand for labo r
regi ster ed duri ng and afte r the hot war, in most
coun tries urban labo r
markets were kept soft by cont1nuing inflo ws .f'ran
the labo r-ab unda nt
coun trys ide. In add ition , seve ral La.tjn /lmerican
coun tries agai n
n.ce ived subs tant ial mnnbers of European inrnig:ran
ts afte r 1945, even
when thei r governments reli ed on trad e union supp
ort, as 1n Arg entin a.
In spit e of thei r weaknesses, by the earl y 1950
s trad e unions in most
coun tries had sign ifica nt influ ence at leas t in
pub lic and othe r larg e
urban ente rpri ses, and 1n modern tran spor t. Part
icul arly 1n thei r
barg aini ng with foreign-owned firm s, they corrrnand
ed cons ider able govern
mental and popu lar supp ort.

r:v. PERFORMANCE

,

Even in coun tries perfonn:ing reas onab ly well duri
ng the 1930s,
stru ctur al change was m:>re imp ress ive than ove
rall growth; duri ng that
decade sone ecooomic acti viti es stag nate d or coll
apse d whil e othe rs
surged ahead.

In con tras t, duri ng 1941-51 all La.tin American
coun tries
and near ly all major economic acti viti es (wit h
the imp orta nt exce ptio n
of agri cult ure and live stoc k, espe cial ly .1n the
Southern Cone) grew

-18at rates which exceeded populatio n expansion and were hi~.,h relative
both to previous experience and to perfonnance in the rest of the
world.

Output growth outpaced capacity expansion during the war., but

during 1945-51 the opposite occurred, as a result of a remarkable
investrren t boom.

Between the end of the war and 1953 the La.tin American

capital stock increased by one-third (United Nations, 19511, p. 3).

'Inc

growth mmentum was rnainta.med until the early 1950s, in spite of
distortio ns and misalloca tions whose negative impact became clearer
later in the 1950s.

A. Macroeconomic Performance
South American countries experiencing a vigorous recovery fran
the depression dur:1ng 1933-39., registere d more modest expansions in their
Gross Dcmestic Products (GDPs) during 1939-45.

'Ihis was the case in

Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Chile, where capacity limitatio ns beca11e
particula rly acute during the war.

While national accounts data are

scarcer for Central American, Caribbean and other smaller countries ,
it appears that they followed the war-induced accelerat ion in GDP gro~th
occurring in North Arrerica.

Mexico rna.inta.med the growth morrentum

achieved since the early 1930s., thanks to favorable access to
external supplies (Naciones Unidas, 1978).
'Ihe second half of the 19li0s witnessed an average annual growth
'1n Latin Arierican per capita GDP of more than three percent; all groups

of countries participa ted in this remarkable perfonnance (United Nations,
196lf, p.6). '!be postwar boan came to an end during the first half of

the 1950s 1n the Southern Cone and some caribbean countries , such as
Cuba, but it continued in coffee exporting countries , as well as 1n
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.

For the region as a whole, per

capita GDP grew at the still substanti al rate of two percent per annum
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during the first half of the 1950s.

Adjustinr; GDP for tenns of trad~

chanr.;es im.kes the 19115-50 boor:1 even more 1mpressive, yieldinr; for those
years an average yearly (",I"owth, for the region as a whole, of rore
than four percent in per capita real incane.

As

the presence of

foreirJ} capital in the region, particularly outside Cuba and Venezuela,

had declined sharply by the late 1940s, those increases 1n real
.

.

:tnccrne accrued overwhelmingiy t~ Latin Americans.

For the region as

a whole, net factor payments abroad had declined to around two percent
of GDP by the late 1940s; interest and profit of foreign capital ac
counted for about ten percent of Latin American foreign exchange
earnings at that time.
D..lring the war the capital stock in all major sectors was :In
tensively used; shortages of machinery and equiprent often meant that
even repairs had to be improvised and obsolete capital was kept operating.
Investment suri;ed after 1945, absorbing a good share of the foreien
exchange reserves accumulated during the war and of the improvements
in the tenns of trade.

'lhe gross investment coefficient 1n GDP during

1945-49 for the region as a whole reached 18 percent and remained only
slightly below that figure during 1950-54 (United Nations, 1964,p.ll).
Current domestic savings plus those carried out during the war financed
practically all of the investment boan, which extended both to the
1

ccnstruction needs of accelerated urbanization and the replacerrEnt and
expansion of capacity in the fonn of machinery and equipment.

Imports

of capital gocx:is also contributed to the absorption of technolop.;ical
change which had taken place during the late 1930s and early 1940s.
The

investment s~e occurred both 1n the public and private sectors,

with the latter accotmting for approximately 70 percent of gross capital
accumulation.

While external supply conditions r,radually improved
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after 1945, specific supply short8.{';es bedevil led investrr ent project s
well into the 1950s.

'Ihe priority given by the United States to

European recovery and the Korean War delayed or distorte d more than
a few Latin American investment project s for lack of desired machinery
and equipment.

Because of her non-alig ned stance in interna tional

relation s., Arr;entina was especia lly vulnera ble to such complic ations
in capital formation.
Replacement, moderni zation, and urbaniz ation needs also influenc ed
the structur e of private consur:iption after the war.

Automobiles,

televisi on sets, and refriger ators, as well as nylon stocking s and
soft drinks were eagerly sourr,ht in the rapidly expanding cities. Local
industF J could meet only part of those needs, and by the early 1950s
severe foreifll exchanri:e shortage s were to make imported automobiles
Urban middle

an exotic luxury good in Brazil and the Southern Cone.

classes , frustrat ed by their lack of access to many imported durable
consumer goods turned to luxury housing w};.ile wa.1 tine for the local
manufac ture, typicall y by foreign corpora tions, of the desired conrnod ities.
8. For-eirn Trade a11d Sectora l Performance

Much of the evolutj_on of Latin Arrerican foreign trade durfne the
1940s and early 1950s can be explaine d simply as a consequence of exogenous
shocks and trends emanating from the rest of the world.

But not all.

~specia lly by the early 1950s differen t exchange rate and trade policie s
were reflecte d in contras ting export perfonn ances. Foreit11 exchange
earning s continue d to grow in many Central An~rican and Caribbean
countri es, as well as in Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela., while
tending to stagnate in Brazil and the Southern Cone.

Sorre country shares

:1n total regiona l exports chanced dramati cally relative to the

late 1920s and 1930s, partly because of danestic policie s and partly due
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to luck in the co:-:modity lottery .

Ar,,;cntina had represe nted more than

one thin:! of the exnorts of all Latin AMcrican reo;.1bl
ics in 1Q28 , and one
.
quarte r 1n 1938; by 195~ it accounted for only 13 percen t of that total.
'Ihe co~spo nding Venezuelan shares rose from 4 percen t in 1928,
~

to 15 percen t in 1938 and to 22 percen t by 1954.

The Latin .American

share in world exports in 1954 was about what it had been in 1928,
and was higher than in 1938. 'Ihat share, ho'l-iever, peaked in 1948.
(United Hation s, 1954, pp. 124 and 137),
Tne war accele rated a tendency toward export divers ificati on
already visible during the late 1930s • .Argentina, Brazil and Mexico
exporte d substa ntial amounts of manufactured produc ts, even to South
Africa .

New items entered the export bills of many countr ies and

there was a trend toward rrore dorrestic proces sing of traditi onal export s,
partly to save shippin g space. 'Ihere was also an increas e in intra
Latin American trade, and propos als for closer Latin .American economic
integra tion blossomed at that time, partic ularly in the Southern Cone.
After 1945, however., both the boom in primary produc t prices as well
as dorrestic policie s 1.nduced a retrea t from those trends , so that by
the early 1950s the Latin American export bill was again heavily con
centra ted in relativ ely few corrrnodities with little proces sing. Coffee ,
petroletE.1, susar and wool accounted for oore than half of the region 's
export s.

In 1937 those four comnodities represe nted about one third of the

region 's export s,and the top four items then(p etrolcu m,coff ee,mai ze and Kheat)
added to less than forty percen t of all export s. (United Nation s 1949.,
pp. 276-278., and United Nations., 1954, p.132) . Both r.ianufactured export
s
and 1n~ra-Lat1n .Arrerican trade shrive lled after the war; the share of
export s going to the United States was much higher in the late 1940s

than a decade earlie r, but tended to declin e as Europe and Japan recove red.
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In 1953 a report of the Economic Cor.rrl.ssion for Latin Am?rica

remarked:
"Althouf")l at one time the ajms of Lat:1n J\merican economic
development were assumed to :include liberation fror.i the
burden of ir.:ports, the facts show that this ob.jcctive is
very far from be:1ng achieved 11 (United Nations, 1953,p.xxi).
While such peculiar liberation had not been nccQ'il)lished,
inl)orts of goods and services for the region as a whole had bee:1 com
pressed below 15 percent of GDP by the late 1940s and early 1950s,
no doubt below correspond.mg figures for the late 1920s.

'Ihe openness

of Central American and Caribbean countries was of course above the
regional average, while Brazil and the Southern Cone by the early 1950s
had foreim trade shares :1n GDP lower than most Western European countries.
Susta1ning W.j';regate growth which exceeded that for foreign trade
implied ver-J different gro~·.th perfo:rr.iances :1n various branches of
economic activi t:1.

We now turn to exa'1lin:1np; such sectoral differences,

which generally continued the structural cha"1ees of the 1930s.
Industry, broadly defined to include rrd..'11ng, construction and
electricity, was the star performer while rural activities barely
kept up with population growth, when the ref:;ion and sectors are taken
as a whole.

Conpar'inr-; 1950-54 w-ith 1936-40 the following average

annual percentage growth rates are obtained for the major canponents
of the rer:µon's GDP (United Nations, 1964,p.26):
Crops, livestock, hunting and fishing
M:1ning and quarrying
Manufacturing
Building
TI'ansport and corrmmication
TI'ade and f:1nance
Governrrent
Other services
'lbtal GDP

2.4
6.0
5.9
6.5

6.o
lj. 9

5.1
3.7
lj. ~
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n.tring

the same period, the export quantlll'!1 grew at an a."lnual

rate of only 0.5 percent (Naciones Unidas, 1976, p.25); thanks to
the 1mproving tenns of trade the import quantum expanded at a hir,her
rate, but still below that of GDP.

Population r.;rowth accelerated

throw;hout the period, averag.1n~ around 2. 4 percent per
reach.mp; 2. 7 percent per annum by 1950-55.

an.111r.1,

and

'!'he expa.'1sion of urban

population was of course higher, and accelerated from 3.4 percent per
annt.nn during 1940-li5 to 4.5 percent per annum durine; l'.)50-55 (United
Nations, 1954,p.29).
In the more industrialized countries of the rer,;ion, exceptinr:;

Mexico, manufacturing growth during the war slowed do'i-'m froM the rates
registered during 1933-39, and was also below postwar industrial
expansion.
goods

'lhe negative impact of shortages of corr;:,lementary imported

turned out to be greater than the positive effect of the near

disappearance of competitive in:ports.

Much of the 1930s industrial

expansion in .Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Chile was based on intensive
use of existing capacity both in manufacturing and .in social overhead
capital; the further squeezing of installed capacity during the war:
in spite of frequent feats of technological improvisation, began to run
into insunnountable problems.

Without imported rna.cWnery it was

difficult to start new manufacturing activities and absorb forei;,;n
.technological breakthroUP')lS.

Electricity, fuel and transport, besides

inputs used more directly in the manufacturing process, spare oarts,
machinery for repairs and capacity expansion., all became extremely
scarce at

"any"

price.

Electricity output expanded very fast between

the late 1930s and early 1950s, but demands r,enerated by urbanization
and industrializati oo grew even faster, so shortar.;es persisted in
countries·well into the 1950s.

many
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As the supply constraints became easier in the irrr.lcdiate postwar,

manufacturing output soared a11d diversified, in spite of rema:1.ninr.;
shortar;es of nontradeable inputs and of sa'":'le imported c~le~ntary
items.

'Ihe more industrialized countrie~ on the whole rna1nta:1.ned a

protectionist stance toward ccrnpetitive imports, raru:;in[!; from the
extreme, as in Argentina, to the moderate, as in Mexico.

'Ihe postwar

manufacturing boom showed signs of falterin~ in 1949, and experienced
a rrore serious setback in 1952-53.
The less industrialized Latin American countries, which during

the late 1930swere far from using their full capacity, saw their
manufacturing output grow dur:1.ne the 1940s faster than in the previous
decade; during the war

many

of them also benefitted from geov--aphical

and political proxinity to the United States.

Even by 1950-54, however,

nianufacturing in these countries still represented around 10 percent of
GDP, while in Argent:ina, Brazil and Chile it was above 20 percent
(United Nations, 1954, pp. 27-28).

For Lat:in America as a whole the

share in GDP of mining, manufacturing, plus construction was below that
of rural activities 1n 1936-40; by 1950-54 this was no longer the case.
Within manufacturing, sectors which had spearheaded import
substituting growth during the 1930s, such as cotton textiles, building
materials and light metallurgical and chemical activities, continued their
remarkable expansion into the 1940s; during the war, textile exports added
modest ll?l)etus to industrial expansion in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.

War shortages of inte~diate inputs, such as steel, and of machinery
and equipment encouraged at least concern with expa"1ding "heavier"

industrial activities; preoccupation in the .Anmd Forces with military
supplies reinforced that trend, especially in South America.

l)irinp; the

ea..... . l~; l~l;Js the United States, fearinr. a prolonr:e d war, enco~~'"':<:-,3
industr ial expansio n in several closely allied. Latin .A.':lerica'1 countr1~ s,
notatl:, !3razil.

Man? of the proJect s started to eX}'")a"1d t~ie dcr.ia.in

o:' the "Arse:-;al of ~mocrac y", such as the Volta P.edo:1c:a steel r.Jll,
e:1tered producti on a!'ter U-:c end of the v:ar, b:: v:hict t:..""le the Ur:i ter.

in :..atin
durir:w: the 1940s, r,oinr: as far as startine a"1 aton:!.c enel"f"Y pro(O"a":l.
froducti on of r~:on :~a'l"J"1, pip: iron, a'1d sulphur ic

industri al1zed countrie s, spread rapidly after 1?45.

'.Jeverth eless,

for the recic:i as a w:-iole t:1 1950-54 the traditio nal branche s of
manufac turing (food processi.'1f:', tobacco , textiles , clothinr ;, buHdinr 
rnateria ls) still dorJnate d rra.11afact·.ll'i.'1g'_ output, a'1d r.ariy of ther.i
rer.ained horre a11d handicr aft operatio ns.

~orts of r.iach:...'1ery ·and

equipi:E nt r.iade up a very lar~e f'ractioo of r;ross investne nt in these
i:;oods, even in the most ind 11stria.li zed Latin .timerican countrie s.
Manufacturir..g e;rowth dur'i.'11; the late 19-40s a."'ld early l 950s
bega11 to shov, a charact eristic which would beccrne even more disturbfr1r,
in Jater years:

a specific branch of producti on would

grow

very fast

during a couple of decades or so, using up-tCHi ate technolo gy, until
hare output had displace d 1.rr;:>orts; afterwar ds that sector would grow
ooly modestl y, and its installe d capacity would gradual ly age and fall
behind tecmolo e-,ical and product 1.rr;:>rovem:?nts abroad.

In that import

substitu ting cycle, "dynamic" industr ies gradual ly turried into
''vegeta tive" ooes not only regardin g growth rates but also in their
technol ogical levels and product quality.

In the roore industr ialized
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count:rlcs one t,cp,a'l to r.cc not ,1 ust the old dichotor.r..' of }12..nuicra:ts
and mocern factories, tut :a t·.·11olc sncctrun of averar;e lator product1 v1 ties ,
or i•tec~olop;ical den::,ities'', with the latest ~rt-suristituti~
branches hav:'_nr,: the hir~-.est productivit.v, if measured at domestic
prices including protection incentives.
Tarif'f-jumpinr: direct forcir-n investnent had cor.tributed to
jmport substitution 1n Drazil and th·i Southern Cone at least si:-ice the
1920s and continued to play a modest role durinr~ the 1930s.

Even during

the war United States corporaticns invested in Latin .Arnerican rnanufacturiw,; .
after 1945 such i..'1Vestments multiplied spurred b:r protectlon and the
fast expansion of regional markets.

The technoloi;v supplled by foreic;n

corporations beca.':le crucial for the advance of import substitution
into newer and rore complex branches in chemicals, metallu:rrzy and transport
equipment.

The gross inefficiencies induced by the comb.ination of

excessive protection and direct foreign investment, especially outside
,

Brazil, were to culminate .1n several countries with the establishment of
inchoate automobile industries.

The corr:pelling economic logic and the

nationalistic m,vstique of the industrialization efforts of the 1930s and
early 1940s were gradually eroded by the increasing visibility of inef
ficiencies and direct foreign investments durin~ the postwar.
Construction boomed durin~ the 1940s and early 1950s even more than
manufacturinc;; in several countries this continued 1930s trends.

E>.-plosive

urbanization and the mcreasing use of autornobiles and trucks generated
an almost insatiable appetite for ceirent.

Table 2 shows remarkable per

capita grm•,th rates for apparent cement consumption in most countries,
even when 1925-28 is taken as the base.

'Ihe table also shows a catchinr; -

up ~~th United States consumption levels which occurred in many countries

for this indicator of development.

Cement was a ma..1or ir.Jport substituting
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Table 2
Per Ca;11ta Apparent Cen:nt Consur:1!)tion: Relat ive
-~o tl1.£._ Unite d !..;tates and Grm:t h Rates 1()2:.-.-1953
2
Per Capit a ConsUJ~tion
(U.S. equa1.s 100)

1925-28
Cuba
Uruguay
Argen tina
Puert o Rico
Chile
Venezuela
Panama
Co!3ta Rica
Ix>minican Pepublic
Ja.'Tlaica

Peru
Braz il
El Salva dor
Colan bia
Mexico
Ecuador
Guatemala
1Ionduras
Haiti
Nicar agua
Boliv ia
Paraguay

Unite d State s

33
29
22
19
19
17
15
11
9
8
.7
6
5
5
5
3
3

2
2
2
2

1
100

1950-53

35
51
41
83
39
66
27
17
19
18
18
16
9
22
22
9
8
5
3
8
5
2
100

AveraJ".,e annual p;rm..t h
rates , percenta,r-es

1925-28/1']'50-53
· 0.5
2.6
2.8
6.3
3.3
6.0
2.8
1.9

1935-38~19SCJ-53

". 2
2.1

8.1
4.9
2.4
9.6
3.2
11.4
3.1
1.8
8.3
5.1
6.6
7,0
6.2
8.1
8.4
5.4
1.0
4.9
6.8
4.2
4.9
1.2

0.3

4.6

3.'l

3.6
4.0
4.5
2.3.
6.2
6.8
4.8
Jr

-,

.

"'.>

.)

3.6
1.7
6.1

Sourc es:
Data obtain ed from European Cement Asso ciatio n, 1967.
consumption refer s to produ ction plus inl)or ts minus expo rts.

Apparent
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:industr:1, ~owl.ng at an ann:.ial rate of more than 11 nercent between 1925-23
and 1935-38, and at an almo:;t 9 percent arinual rate bctNeen 1935-38 and
1950-53, for the rep;ion as a whole.

'lhcsc

growth rates could not have

been based just on a more inten31ve use of installed capacity; substantial
investments and imports of machinery must have taken place in the cement
industry.

While during the late 1920s Latin America produced only 36 percent

of its cement conslXTq)tion, the correspondine; fiQ..lI'e for 1935-38 was 78

percent, and for 19:i0--53 it was 85 percent.
Petroleur.i extraction and refininp: were also encouraged by the spread

-

of the automobile. Even before Mexican frictions with foreign oil companies
culminated in the 1938 nationalizations, the Venezuelan oil boom had

gathered momentum.

During the 1930s the net returned value to Venezuela

from the activities of foreiQ1 oil companies on its soil was quite small,
.
I
I
but this situation was chanr.;ed in the mid-19 4Os when the Accion D?~ocratic~
governro:;nt pioneered the fifty-fifty formula for splitting rents.

In

1938 Venezuela accounted for 59 percent of world petroleum exports; by
1948 that share was dO\•,n to a still impressive 54 percent, declining
during the 1950s as Middle f.,ast deposits were favored by oil companies
(United Nations, 1964, p.139),

Petroleum extraction was significant

but less inportant in Argentina, Colombia, Peru and of course Mexico; in
these and other I.atin American countries oil production and marketing

was daninated by state enterprises.

Luring the 1940s and early 1950s

those national enterprises had difficulty in expand~ production due
part}.y

to a reluctance of foreim suppliers of equipment and credit

(including the World Bank) to deal with them., unless international oil
coopanies were part of the arrangements,
Other extractive activitie_s., both traditional and new; .received
inpetus f:rom the war.

A number of mininr, projects were encourar:cd by

the Unlted States government to satisfy wartine needs such as a nickel
plant in Cuba and several ventures in Brazil.

'lhe outbreak of Korean

29
hosti lities renewed inter est in these r.rlning proje cts, but brief
ly.
By 19~2-53 mining faced depre ssed inter natio nal price G.
'Ihe sar.e broad trend s and signa ls \'1hich induced ~or t subst itutin
r:
indus triali zatio n after the late 1920s also encoura,~ed rural
activ ities
to turn from ex!)ortin~ toward producing for the domestic marke
t durin g
the 1930s and 1940s.

The ag~c ate outpu t of expor table rural com

modi ties, such as coffe e, wool,and banan as, remained pract ically
unchanr;cd
between 1934-38 and 1950-53, while produ ction of goods destin
ed almos t
exclu sively for domestic consu 3/tion rose by more than fifty
perce nt
(United Natio ns, 1954, p .135) .

Sore crops under,-,ent exnan sions com

parab le to those of dynamic rnanu.facturin.r; branc hes; rice outpu
t, for
example, more than doubled betv.reen 1934--38 and 1950-53, War
devas tation
1n the Far East, which favor ed many La.tin .American expo
rts, contr ibute d

to such import subst itutio n.
The share consumed dorre stical ly of even rural expor table outpu
t
rose, most dra'Tia.tically in Argen tina. Coun tries which histo rical
ly had
expor ted primary produ cts but imported food became consc ious
of their
wlne rabil ity on the expor t side durin g the 1930s and on their
:import
side durin g the early 1940s. A sober obser ver noted in 1948:
.
"Experience has shm.n that in the prese nt uncer
state of
inter natio nal trade , speci aliza tion is a gcmble that ata.1n
respo nsibl e
goven11Tient must try to avoid . The least that natio ns with agri
cultu ral oppo rtuni ties, such as abound in r.iost areas of La.tin
A"nerica,
shoul d aim at is to be able to feed themselves from their
oi\n
produ
ce,
_so that they can sit out a depre ssion witho ut suffe ring actua
l
starv ation " (Wall ich, 1948, p.162 ).
Faced ~r:1.th uncer tain exter nal prosp ects and often disco urage d
by dorre stic polic ies, produ cers of expor table prima ry
produ cts in

many

coun tries did little to modernize their produ ction methods.
P~rpean
techn iques and Cuban sugar yield s, for exan+>le,duri'1e the early
1950s
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. Grentr;'r
\';ere little chanr;ed from what they had been in the late 1930s
techn ologi cal dynanis.111 ,-:as shm.n by sotre import subst itutin r: rural
t sprea d
activ ities ; capit alist ~nrminr; producing for the domestic marke
sub
rapid ly durin g the 1940s and early 1950s, even as tradi tiona l
ctlon
sisten ce farmin r, remained the predorunant rural rrode of produ
which underwent
1n the poore st count ries of the regio n. Even Mexico,
a
a serio us land refom durin g the 1930s, by the early 1950s had
pro
rural secto r encanpassinr, produ ctive units of vastl y di~fe rent
Since the 1930s, Mexico, Centr al American and other
ation
count ries expa~ded areas under cultiv ation by inves ting in irriG

ducti vitie s.

and roads .
The vast and heterogeneous servi ce secto r ~lso engaged in
g the
impor t subst itutio n durin g the 1940s. Shipp:1.n,r; short ages durin
ance,
war induced the expansion of natio nal merchant marin es; insur
·
banld ng, and corrrnercialization of i.'Tlports and expor ts ca"ne under
i~
great er natio nal contr ol in the more advanced coun tries. Fore
remit 
exchange earnin gs fran servi ces such as touris.-rn and work ers'
Mexico
tance s became signi fican t items in the balan ce of payments of
and Caribbean count ries.

In those coun tries which maint ained acmu.n

, some
istra tivel y corrplex impor t-repr ess:in g mechanisms into the 1950s
-rent s;
corrrnercial and government servi ces recei ved subst antia l quasi
clear
·whil e preci se inform ation is unava ilable , it seems reaso nably
tradi 
that not all of the terms of trade r.,ains siphoned off from the
their
ticna l expor t secto r durinr; the late 1940s and early 1950s found
l overhead
w;zy into inves trrent in manufacturine; and produ ctive socia
capit al.

A sif,1i fican t share appears to have filter ed on the wa.v

into servi ces of sundry natur e.
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C. Incorre distrihuUon and welfare
If national accounts data for the 19/tOs are spott:,, those for
1ncane distribution are practically nil.

Discussion of chanP-;es 1n

1ncorre distribution becomes hi.G'J1ly speculative.

A possible clue to

those trends r.,ay cane from examining changes in the allocation of the
labor force, and productivity in the different sectors of the econany.
By the late 1930s alm:)st 60 percent of the econo~ically active
Latin American population was 1n agriculture, livestock, forestry and
fishing.

By 1955 that share was about 50 percent.

Between the late

1930s and the early 1950s the average labor productivity gap between
rural and non-rural activities widened but only slip')1tl:,r, with the
latter reaching 3.7 ti.Ires the former by the end of the period (United
Nations; 1964, pp. 29-31).

A very roup,h surrrnary of Latin American

development durine those years may be given by saying that ten percent
of the labor force was reallocated from a rural low-productivi ty sector
to a non-rural high-productiv ity sector, with modest increases occurrinR;
in the average productivity of each sector, but without a narrowing of
the productivity gap between them.

It would be erroneous to associate that reallocation with a shift
"from agriculture to industry." Much of th~ increase in non-rural

e~loyrnent cane from construction and a large variety of services, fran
-the highly productive to those disguising unemployment.

'lhe heteroeeneity

within non-rural activities regarding averaee labor productivities must
have been as high as that within the rural sector.

For the rep,ion as

a whole, manufacturing proper e~loyed little more than 14 percent of
the active population by the early 1950s, only three tir.les those enga.r;ed
1n construction.

~

acceleration of urbanization durinr; the 1940s

had a rnonentum larr;ely autonomous from the f";I'Owth of manufacturing.
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It

may

also be noted that the share of population livin~ 1n area:

rer;arded as rural (localities with less than 2,000 inhabitants ) was
arotmd 8 percentap;e points higher than the share of the labor force
engaged in rural productive activities throw,hout the 1940s and
early 1950s (United !-Jations, 19611, p. 29) •
'Ille errployrrent eains in manufactu r~, constructio n and other

relatively hir)l-produ ctivity urban activities must have raised the
economic welfare of those fortunate to be amonri: the hired, but the
impact of these trends on measures of incorre distributio n, such as
Gini coefficient s, is moot.

'Ihe postwar boom and populist policies

in several countries led to increases in the'share of wages in the

value added of some urban activities, but it is unclear how much
of those gains survived post-1951 softer labor markets plus inflationar y
conditions.

In the countryside the 1930s and 1940s witnessed important

structural changes in land and labor allocation amon~ subsistence
farming, capitalist farming for dorrestic markets and production of
traditional exportables .

In sane countries, notably Mexico in the

1930s and Bolivia in the 1950s; public policy led to important chan~es
in land tenure.

A plausible case (but weaker than for the urban sector)

could be made that improvements in average rural welfare levels occurred
up until the early 1950s, but little can be said rep;arctln~ the evolution

of standard m?asures of inequality, either within sectors or for the
eccnaey as a whole.

What was clear by the early 1950s was that hopes

that industriali zation would by itself induce p;reater equality and
ellminate poverty had been rnis/:!;Uided.

The

postwar boom had left

behind highly visible symbols of disparity between rich and poor, as
with luxury urban housing near mushrooming shantytowns , and between a

.

,.
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hand ful of dynamic citie s, often bure aucra tic rathe r than
indu stria l
cent ers, and the rest of La.tin America.
Educ ation al and healt h indic ators sw~c st slow but stead
y
welf are irrq:)rovements, while rema:ining far behind those
of indu stria lized
coun tries . 'Ihe prop ortio n of illit erat es in the popu latio
n of 15
years and older around 1950 had falle n to 14-15 perce nt
in Ar?:entina
and Uruguay, and to 20-22 perce nt in Chile , Costa ·Rica
and Cuba.
It was still 89 perce nt in Hait i, 71 perce nt in Guatemala,
and more
than 50 perce nt in Boliv ia, Braz il, tominican Repu blic,
El Salv ador,
Honduras, Nicar3.t,r;ua and Peru (United Natio ns, 1951J , p. 60)
. Among the
rura l popu latio n, the perce ntage of illite rate s was
of cours e even
high er, reach ing 67 perce nt in Braz il and around 40 perce
nt even in
Cuba, Chile , and Panama.
By the late 1940s death rates had falle n to less than 10
per
thousand :1nhahita'1ts in .Argentina and Urugua.v, to iess
than 15 in Cuba,
and to less than 20 in Chile , Costa Rica , Mexico; Nica
ragua , Pa'1ama,
Paraguay and Venezuela (United Natio ns, 1951J., p.77 ). Boliv
ia., Guatemala
and Hait i prese nted the wors t death rates . Neve rthel ess,
as in the
rest of the world, nedic al break throu ghs durin g the 1940
s raise d healt h
stand ards in oost coun tries indep ende ntly of ·econorrJ.c grow
th
perfo nnan ce.

V. '.mE 19qos IEGACY
By the early 1950s most Iatin Arrerican economies showe
d struc tural
char acte risti cs sharp ly diffe rent from those of the late
1920 s.
'!he

share of fore1.p.n trade in GDP was cut; in many coun tries
per capi ta
forei gn trade was also below pre-d epres sion leve ls. The
fore im debt
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slate had been wiped almost clean; direct foreip;n inve~trrent had shifted
toward manufacturing for the dornentic market and awa,v fror:, export.:1nr;
activities and social overhead capital, especially outside Cuba, Central
Arrerica and Venezuela.

Public sectors had expanded their role .1n

production, credit and regulation.

Population r;rowth had accelerated 1n

rost countries and internal migrations had becane far more important
than those across borders, leadinr, to unprecedented expa~sion of major
cities.

Partly due to the decline of foreic;n trade, partly due to

urbanization and new products, the structure of private consumption had
also undergone :important changes.
Reviewing the 1930s and 1940s most Latin Americans could feel
lucky, at least relative to the rest of humanity.

The Spanish and the

Chinese Civil Wars, World War II, the depth of depression in the United
States, Stalinist purges, the political dependence of Asia and Africa,
and the pains of decolonization in India and elsewhere could be viewed
by Brazilians and l'iexicans as remote events that "could not happen here
any rore. 11 Old aspirations rep-.,arding industrialization and control over
for-ei@"l investment seemed on the

WB:;f

to becCATie realities.

Some progress

had also been made in democrdtizin~ Latin American societies;

trade

unims had expanded and political life had becc:rne more open and
pluralistic in several countries.

In contrast with the ideological,

relif;l.ous, and ethnic frenzies of Europe., India, and even N'orth America,
rost Latin Americans viewed themselves then as tolerant, a view largely
correct at least in relative terms, and demonstrated by the many refur;ees
who found a haven in the region.

With the exception of the Chaco War,.

the ColOtlbian violence, and the outrages of Central Arrerican and
CBribbean tyrannies, sare of which had been installed by the United
States Marines, the 1930s and 1940s witnessed little poJ.itical blood
letting in Latin America.
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Exce ptins ; Art,m t1na , poli tica l and econ anic relat
ions between
Latm America and the Unit ed Stat es 1.r.;)roved mark
edly durin g the pres iden cies
of F'rari}•:lin IA?lano Roos evelt , reach ing a heig ht
of 1nt1r.lacy dW"inr: the
war. Lati n ~rlc an cDr.l)laints rose afte r 191J5
, when the Ur.1ted ;tate 3
twne d from intim acy to aloo fnes s, whil e Lat:1n Ame
rica, wit:1 the
deva stati on of Europe and Japa'1, had becc ne rore
depe nden t on Unit ed
State::; sup, ,lies and r-ark ets tha'1 befo re the war.
CoTTJr'laints were \•.'ide
rane;in.r;: wart ime exchanr:e accur:1ulations, deriv ed
from expo rts at
ceili nr, pric es inpo sed by the Unite d Stat es, nElt
ed tmde r the heat of
doll ar :infl ation ; deve lopre nt loan s, pran ised at
Rret ton Hoods, were
hard ly visi ble; war t~ prcr.J.ses regar di.'1r ; lonr;
-run caT.lOdity pric e
stab iliza tion were forv, otten ; the Mars hall Plan
threa tene d a shortaP::e
of inve strre nt good s as well as of cred its; the
Inte rnat iona l :,1onetary
F'\md seemed unab le to achie ve the conv ertib
ility of .European cur:r encie s;
and the Unit ed Stat es moved away !'ran the
Inte rnat iona l Trade Orp'.,anization,
prefe rrinp ; to conc entra te en the narro wer pr:1n ciple
s of the Gene ral
Agreement on Tari ffs and Trad e, viewed less favo
rably by La.tin American
cotm tries . Our prev ious ly quot ed sobe r obse rver
wrote in

1948 words

stil l relev ant many year s late r:
"Rec ent vaci llati cns seem to indi cate that as
Unit ed Stat es has not yet succ eede d 1n defin inga natio n the
clea
real istic ally what its :1nteres1s 1n the Lati n .Ame rly and
rican sphe re
are. If the Unit ed Stat es knew ••• what 1t prim arily
wanted
rrorn I.ati n America, whet her it be help in the mamtenar
we
of dem ocra tic idea ls, or mark ets and sour ces of
raw
mate
rials ,
or mili tary and poli tica l supp ort, it would not
so eas~ ly
find itse lf blowing hot and cold 1n quic k succ essic
ri".

(Wallich, 1948, pp, 157-158).

'!he outb reak

of the Korean oost 111t ies brie fly sugg ested a

retu rn to wartime intim acy, bUt by 1952 Lati n lm!r
ican -Uuted Stat es
relat ic:ns had retu rned to a stat e of wire quite d
obse ssicr i which was

to last \l'lti l 1958-59,

3G
Ia.tin J\rnerican economic thinking came into its own durinp; the
19lJOs.

Young technocrats participated in debates at Bretton Woods and

at the Havana con_ference on the International Trade Ory;anization,

meeting not only the leading international economists of the day, but
also each other, findinr.; ccmnon concerns and for~in~ all-Latin ~rican
interests.

The creation of the United Nations Economic Cor:mission

for Latin America was the major impetus behind such Latinoamerican ization
of fresh economic approaches.

Starting with its report for 1948, the par;es

11
of "ECLA or ''CEPAL" :imaginatively discussed topics of intense interest

not only within the region but also outside, ranging from trends in
the terms of trade, to international comparisons of industrial structure,
and to the links between GDP and export growth (see especially ·united
Nations, 1949, p.16, for Chenery-withou t--regressions). Latin .Amcricar1s
were also active in the staffs of Keynes' "lusty twins''; althou,..:;:h by
the early 1950s the twins looked stunted and even defonned., Latin
.Americans in the International Monetary Fund helped to shape ideas
such as the absorption approach to devaluation and the early, flexible
versions of the monetary approach to the balance of payments.
Sare of the ideas generated in that post,·iar fennent proved more·

fruitful than others.

In retrospect, one rnny argue that the ti.Ires

encouraged too much optimism in some matters, and excessive pessimism
in others. The growth of manufactur:1.ng which had occurred since the

-

early 1930s, in spite of external supply and other disruptions, e;enerated
coofidence, particularly in Brazil and the Southern Cone, that further
stages of industrializati on could proceed with just a bit more effort
1n danestic savings and somewhat mre careful planning.

Blocks of

industries, it was felt, could be checked off sequentially:

once
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impo rt subs titut ion had been completed in one,
it could be left alon e
with out claims on ~or ted macWne:ry and new tech
nolo ~ies , usinr, the
scar ce foreiQ1 exchane:e to import the machinery
and tech nolo gien needed
t'or the next stag e of import sub stitu tion . Had
postwar techr.olocy
stoo d stil l in branches of man ufac turin g such
as text iles , that approach
may have ma.de sens e; but it did not, and
plan ts so new in the 1930s
had becorre obso lete by the 1950s, inca pabl e of
expo rting or inde ed
surv ival without a prot ecti on grea ter than when
they had been infa nts.
Many who talk 0d about the need to view corr
parati ve advanta,..1e dynar.J.cally
over look ed the dyna"Tlics of indu stria l tech nica
l chanp.;e.
'lhe many soli d achievements of imp ort- subs titut
ing indu stria liza tion
led sorre to downgrade thos e of pre-1929 expo rt-o
rien ted grov.th. The
many ills of Iati n t..merican soci ety were rigi
dly ' asso ciat ed with pre1929 openness to inte rnat iona l trad e and fina nce.
Fals e hopes were
ther efor e aroused that the rela tive clos ing of
the 1930s and 19~0s would
alle viat e pov erty , reduce 'lmemployrnent, improve
incorre dist ribu tion ,
promote dem ocra tizat ion, elim inat e dependence
on fore igne rs, and make
the stat e will ing a11d able to :fJnprove soci
al welf are. By the late
1950s many had switched thei r fait h from _irn port
-sub stitu ting indu s
tria liza tion to revo lutio n as the way to achi eve
thos e goa ls.
The postwar tenn s of trad e boom was viewed
by infl uen tial obse rver s
-as a tran sien t blip in an irre vers ible decl inin
g tren d goin g on
, at leas t sinc e 1910-14.

Pessim1.sm rega rdin g the outl ook for inte r
nati ona l trad e was rife from eith er Cambridge
(Schumpeter, 1943, p.12 4)

San tiag o de Chil e. Many thow)1t that whateve
r inte rnat iona l trad e
surv ived , it would have to be managed by poli tica
l trea ties , bila tera l
and mul tilat eral . Sane of that pessimism
had diss ipat ed by the late

to
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194Os, only to be reactivated t,y the Korean War.

Dy

1952 a few may

have fores0en the forthcominr :1ntematio~ nl trade exoansion; if so,
they appear to.have kept reasoned forecasts to themselves.
Export-pessimisr:1 was not carried as far as allowinr:,; a serious
decline in the export quantum, except in the Argentine cac;e.

Brazil,

for example, simply ~ave low priority to diversifyinG exoorts,
ma.intainL'1V, its coffee eA"J)Orting potential intact; it had enowJi land
and labor available to promote import substitutio n without damai:sine
its exportable surplus.

Peruvians and Mexicans recovered from their

pessimism more quickly than Brazilians, while Central America'1s
appeared resigned to live durinr-; the 195Os with whatever the 1nter
national econor:w decided to do.

'Thus, some cou.>1tries were 1n a better

position than others to respond to the internatioo al trade expansion
unfolding in the 195Os and stretchin5 1nto the 197Os.

Tne costs

of the lae in j~ing on the new export bandwagon al~o varied,
depending in qualitative ly obvious but perhaps non-linear ways on
size of the dQ11estic market, and on the extent of accumulated policy
bias against exporting.
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